Modal Functional (`Dialectica') Interpretation by Hernest, Dan & Trifonov, Trifon
ar
X
iv
:1
21
2.
00
20
v4
  [
cs
.L
O]
  1
1 S
ep
 20
15
Modal Functional (‘Dialectica’) Interpretation
Dan Hernesta,1,∗∗, Trifon Trifonovb,2,∗
aThe “Simion Stoilow” Institute of Mathematics of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania
bFaculty of Mathematics and Informatics, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Sofia, Bulgaria
Abstract
We adapt our light Dialectica interpretation [17] to usual and light modal formulas (with universal quantification on
boolean and natural variables) and prove it sound for a non-standard modal arithmetic based on Go¨del’s T and classical
S4. The range of this light modal Dialectica is the usual (non-modal) classical Arithmetic in all finite types (with
booleans); the propositional kernel of its domain is Boolean and not S4. The ‘heavy’ modal Dialectica interpretation
is a new technique; it cannot be simulated within our previous light Dialectica. The synthesized functionals are at
least as good as before; the translation process is much improved and could be more suitable for the human operators.
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The present work supersedes the functional synthesis technique outlined in our previous paper [17] by adding
a useful device for (homogeneously) combining the effect of previous optimizations by partly and fully uniform
quantifiers in a compact discharger of constructive potential, namely the modal operator  (and its weak co-modality˜^ ≡ ¬  ¬ ). Proofs which are not necessarily constructive may yet potentially contain constructive content; in order
to make use of this constructive ‘charge’ contained in a (non-constructive) proof, various ‘discharge’ instruments have
been created over the past decades. We will prove that  is not “syntactic sugar” over the previous light Dialectica,
but a genuinely new device (albeit synthesized out of previous works). We also bring the following result: while the
modal propositional axioms of system S4 are realizable, the defining axiom of S5 is not realizable (in general) under
the (light) modal Dialectica (by primitive recursive functionals of finite type).
The use and interpretation of modal operators in this paper were inspired by work of Oliva (partly joint with the
first author, see [16]) at the linear logic level, see [27, 28]. It is no coincidence that, at formula level, our interpretation
of  A is syntactically the same as Oliva’s modified realizability interpretation of ! A in intuitionistic linear logic.
However, a certain detour would be needed in order to simulate  A in terms of ! A, which may be less suitable for
the processing of natural proofs by human operators (see Remark 1.23 in [10]).
The second author independently noticed the possibility of using the same supra-linear modal operators for light
program extraction in [37], see also [38]. However, the initiative of studying the full employment of  for more
efficient functional synthesis in the formal context of the negative fragment of first-order modal logic (cf. Schu¨tte [33]
and later discovered Prawitz [31]) belongs to the first author. As we will see, for our extractive purposes it is useful to
depart from Schu¨tte’s original semantics for quantified modal logic. For example, the propositional fragment of our
first-order modal systems is not modal, but purely boolean, as  p ≡ p ≡ ˜^ p for propositional atoms p.
We thus design two non-standard modal arithmetics, NAm ⊂ NAml , for functional program synthesis. The sound-
ness of these input systems is syntactically given via our (light) modal functional interpretation by the target system,
namely classical decidable-predicate Arithmetic with higher-type functionals, in a Natural Deduction presentation.3
For an easier exposition we will give up the ‘non-standard’ prefix. Throughout the paper, our modal Arithmetics
are non-standard (relative to the conservative extensions of S4 due to Prawitz and Schu¨tte) but they resulted in a natural
manner relative to the Dialectica interpretation. It turns out that NAm intrinsically relates to the modally closed subset
of Prawitz’s C′S5 (cf. [31], page 77). Note that there has been some recent attention to formalizing Quantified Modal
Logic stemming from Artificial Intelligence research (cf. [12]) and there is a dedicated whole Chapter 12 of [24] .
1. Arithmetical systems for light and / or modal Dialectica extraction
We build upon functional arithmetical systems NA and (the light annotated) NAl from [17] . While the verifying
system NA basically is the Arithmetic Z of Berger, Buchholz and Schwichtenberg [4] in a slightly different presen-
tation which is more suitable for light functional synthesis and features full classical logic (without strong existence)
and full extensionality4, its light counterpart NAl is only partly classical. Moreover, the input system NAl is weakly
extensional and its contraction (and hence also induction) rule is restricted for soundness of the (light) functional
interpretation of NAl into NA . In computing terms, the program synthesis algorithm provided by the light Dialectica
(of [17], as inherited from the one5 of [13]) produces correct output only modulo the above-mentioned restrictions on
Extensionality and Contraction6. If not for the weak extensionality, NAl were a conservative extension of NA .
For (light) modal functional synthesis we will use the same verifying system NA . The simpler input system NAm
is obtained by adding  to a restricted variant of NA . This (weakly extensional) modal Arithmetic will be proved
3Note that soundness of Schu¨tte’s predicate modal logics (e.g., S ⋆4 ) is proved non-constructively, using models, see [33] (cf. Chapter I , §4).
4As inherited from system Z, our NA is mostly a Natural Deduction presentation of the so-called ‘negative arithmetic’ from [39], basically a
double-negation, Go¨del-Gentzen embedding of classical into Heyting Arithmetic HAω .
5The restriction on extensionality is at its turn inherited from the pure Go¨del’s functional interpretation [1, 11], whereas the restriction on
contraction was first added by Hernest [13], as it was imposed by the necessity of decidability of the translation of light contraction formulas.
6These restrictions are more relaxed than those from the first author’s PhD thesis and weaker than Go¨del’s restriction on extensionality, Kreisel’s
avoidance of contraction in his Modified Realizability [20] and Girard’s total elimination of contraction in his original Linear Logic [10].
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sound via the modal Dialectica interpretation. The fully-fledged input system NAml adds to NA
m all light universal
quantifiers and is a modal extension of NAl ; its soundness will be given by the light modal Dialectica interpretation.
Together with our new systems NAm and NAml we will also present the relevant details of arithmetics NA and NAl .
Nonetheless for the full picture7 we refer the reader to [17] (see also [37] for a more complete picture).
We will use the same special Natural Deduction (abbreviated “ND”) presentation of our systems as in [17], where
proofs are represented as sequents Γ ⊢ B , meaning that formula B is the root of the ND tree whose leaves Γ are typed
assumption variables (abbreviated “avars”) a : A . Here formula A is the type of the avar a and Γ is a multiset (since
there may be more leaves labeled with the same a : A , cf. [31]-Appendix C-§2, “Variants of Gentzen-type systems”).
The sets of finite types T , terms T (of Go¨del’s T ) , formulas F (of NA ) and Fl (of NAl ) , and , with the addition
of  , formulas F m of NAm and F ml of NA
m
l are defined as follows:
T ρ, σ ::= N | B | (ρ σ )
T s, t ::= xρ | T B | F B | 0 N | S N N | If B ρ ρ ρ | R N ρ (N ρ ρ )ρ | ( λ xρ . tσ )ρ σ | (tρ σ sρ )σ
F A, B ::= at ( tB ) | A → B | A ∧ B | ∀ xρ A ⊥ :≡ at ( F ) , ¬A :≡ A → ⊥
Fl A, B ::= at ( tB ) | A → B | A ∧ B | ∀ xρ A | ∀ {∅,+,−}xρA ∃˜ xρA :≡ ¬ ∀ xρ ¬A
F m A, B ::= at ( tB ) | A → B | A ∧ B | ∀ xρ A | A ˜^ A :≡ ¬  ¬ A
F ml A, B ::= at ( tB ) | A → B | A ∧ B | ∀ xρ A | A | ∀ {∅ ,+ ,−}xρ A
For simplicity we employ two basic types: integers N and booleans B , and use ρ σ τ for ( ρ ( σ τ ) ) . Building
blocks for terms are the constructors for booleans [ T , F ] ( true and false, both of type B ), integers [ 0 , S ] ( zero, of
type N and successor, of type N N ), T -polymorphic case distinction If and T -polymorphic Go¨del recursion R .
Atomic formulas at ( tB ) are decidable by definition, as they are identified with boolean terms tB . In particular,
we have decidable falsity ⊥ :≡ at ( F ) and truth ⊤ :≡ at ( T ) . As usual, we abbreviate A → ⊥ by ¬A . The partially
light universal quantifiers ∀+ , ∀− (partly computational) and ∀∅ (non-computational) are inherited from [17]. The
universal quantifier ∀ , axiomatized as usual in Natural Deduction will have full computational content in the input
systems. The weak existential quantifier ∃˜ is defined for formulas in all our systems as ∃˜ xρ A :≡ ¬ ∀ xρ ¬A . The
weak co-modality operator ˜^ is defined for formulas in F m and F ml as ˜^ A :≡ ¬  ¬ A .
We use the dot-notation for formulas from [35] (see page 3), thus saving on parentheses (and further save on arrows
for types). We purposefully avoid specifying types for terms insofar they can be deduced from the meta-context.
In all our systems, the meta-operator FV ( · ) will return the set of free variables of its argument, which can be a
term or a formula.
Term system T
Computation in our systems is expressed by means of the usual β-reduction rule (λx.t)s →֒ t[x 7→ s] , together
with the rewrite rules defining the computational meaning of If and R :
If T s t →֒ s R 0 s t →֒ s
If F s t →֒ t R (Sn) s t →֒ t n (R n s t)
7However, in the present paper we give a more detailed treatment of the induction for naturals and we correct the typo in the definition of the
weak compatibility rule CMP: on page 1382 of [17], it is s instead of x and t instead of y; we also give the treatment of CMP under Dialectica light.
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Since this typed term system is confluent and strongly normalizing (cf. [35]), we are free not to fix a particular
evaluation strategy. For simplicity, we will assume that all terms occurring in our formal proofs automatically get into
normal form, as normalization is necessary only when matching terms in formulas. We thus avoid introducing equality
axioms like in [13] and skip the corresponding easy applications of extensionality. In conclusion, some computation
gets to be carried out implicitly when building proofs in our systems. (This is just MinLog’s mechanism, see [34] )
Using recursion at higher types we can define any provably total function of ground arithmetic, including decidable
predicates such as equality Eq B for booleans and EqN for natural numbers:
Eq B
B B B :≡ λ x . If x ( λy . y ) ( λy . If y F T )
EqN
N N B :≡ λ x . R x
(
λy . R y T ( λn, qB . F )
) (
λm, pN B , y . R y F ( λn, qB . p n )
)
1.1. The verifying system NA
The logical rules of system NA are presented in Table 2 , with the usual restriction on ∀i (universal quantifier
introduction) that
z < FV ( Γ ) :≡ ⋃ a : A ∈ Γ FV ( A )
At →i , [ a : A ] denotes the multisubset of all occurrences of a : A in the multiset of assumptions of the premise
sequent of →i . Thus a : A < Γ , hence a : A is no longer an assumption in the conclusion sequent of →i . In the usual
tree representation of Natural Deduction proofs, this means that all the leaves labeled “a : A” get inactivated 8 .
Whereas in NA alone we could have safely let all contractions be handled implicitly at →i , in relationship with
the architecture of input system NAl (see Section 1.2) we are compelled to introduce for NA the contraction anti-rule
C in association with the corresponding Cl of NAl , see Table 4 .
We refer to contraction as “anti-rule”, rather than “rule” because, despite the sequent-like representation of our
calculi, in fact our formalisms are ND and in the ND directed tree the representation of explicit contractions is by
convergent arrows that go in the direction which is reverse to the direction of all the other rules. (Sequentwise though,
contraction is a rule, cf. pages 90 ,91 of [31]-A-§1,§2)
We find it convenient to introduce induction for booleans and naturals as the rules presented in Table 5. Here we
assume that the induction variables bB and respectively nN do not occur freely in Γ , nor ∆ , and that they do occur
in the formula A .
The at ( · ) construction allows us to view boolean programs as decidable predicates. Given Ind B , its logical
meaning is settled by the truth axiom TAx , see Table 1 . In this way we can define predicate equality at base types as
s =σ t :≡ at ( Eqσ s t ) for σ ∈ { B , N }
and further at higher types, extensionally as usual
s =ρ τ t :≡ ∀ xρ ( s x =τ t x )
It is straightforward to prove by induction on ρ that =ρ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive at any type ρ .
To complete our system, we include in NA also the compatibility (i.e., extensionality) axiom CmpAx , see Table
1. Note that ex falso quodlibet (EFQ ) ⊥ → A and stability (Stab ) ¬¬A → A are fully provable in NA (cf. [35] ,
by induction on the logical structure of A , using TAx and Ind B ) .
8Or “discharged”, as one usually says in Natural Deduction terminology, but in the context of our paper we could run the risk of a semantic
overload for this unique natural language term.
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TAx : ⊢ at ( T ) CmpAx : ⊢ x =ρ y → A(x) → A(y)
Table 1: Basic axioms, with CmpAx replaced by CMP rule in NAl , see (1)
a : A ⊢ A (id) Γ , [a : A ] ⊢ B →i
Γ ⊢ A → B
Γ ⊢ A ∆ ⊢ A → B
→e
Γ , ∆ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A
∀i
Γ ⊢ ∀z A
Γ ⊢ A ∧ B
∧el
Γ ⊢ A
∆ ⊢ A ∧ B
∧er
∆ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A ∆ ⊢ B
∧i
Γ , ∆ ⊢ A ∧ B
Γ ⊢ ∀z A
∀e
Γ ⊢ A[z 7→ t]
Table 2: Logical rules, with z < FV ( Γ ) at ∀i and contractions for →e and ∧i explicitated as anti-rules, see Table 4
Γ ⊢l A
∀i⋄
Γ ⊢l ∀⋄ z A
Γ ⊢l ∀⋄ z A
∀e⋄
Γ ⊢l A[z 7→ t]
for ⋄ ∈ {∅ , + , −}
Table 3: Additional rules for NAl , with extra restrictions on ∀i+ , ∀i− and ∀i∅ , see (+) , (−) and (∅ ) in Section 1.2
∆ , a : A , a : A ⊢ B
C
∆ , a : A ⊢ B
∆ , a : A , a : A ⊢l B
Cl
∆ , a : A ⊢l B
Table 4: Contraction anti-rules C for NA and (restricted) Cl for NAl , see Remark 1
Γ ⊢ A(T ) ∆ ⊢ A(F )
Ind B
Γ , ∆ ⊢ A(b)
Γ ⊢ A(0 ) ∆ ⊢ A(n) → A(Sn)
Ind N
Γ , ∆ ⊢ A(n)
Table 5: Induction rules, with Γ ⊎ ∆ instead of ‘Γ , ∆ ’and ∆ restricted at Ind N of NAl , see Section 2.2
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1.2. The input system NAl
Light formulas Fl are built over usual formulas F of NA by adding the three light universal quantifiers: the
non-computational ∀∅ and the two semi-computational ∀+ and ∀− .9
Thus, system NAl refines the adaptation of NA (with CMP for CmpAx and Cl for C) with introduction and
elimination rules for the light quantifiers (see Table 3). These are copies of the regular ND rules ∀e and ∀i , but with
the usual restriction on ∀i that z < FV ( Γ ) enhanced with the following conditions referring to the LD-interpretation
of Γ ⊢l A :
(+) at the ∀i+ rule, z may be used computationally only positively, i.e., [ basically z < ∪ni=1 FV ( t i) ]
z must not be free in the challengers of the LD-translation of Γ ( see Section 2 , in particular Theorem 1) .
(−) at the ∀i− rule, z may be used computationally only negatively, i.e., [ basically z < FV ( t 0) ]
z must not be free in the witnesses of the LD-translation of A ( see Definition 1 in the following Section 2)
(∅ ) at the ∀i
∅
rule, z may not be used computationally at all, i.e., both (+) and (−) .
Notice that the restrictions (+), (−) and (∅ ) assume knowledge of the LD - interpretation of whole proofs, in their
full depth, thus forcing the definition of NAl proofs to go inductively in parallel with the LD - extraction of part of
their computational content (namely free variables of the extracted terms).
We simultaneously define the classes of realization irrelevant A⊕ and refutation irrelevant A⊖ formulas as follows
(cf. Definition 1 in Section 2 of [17] ; below ⊔ denotes no thing) :
A⊕ , B⊕ ::= at ( t ) | A⊕ ∧ B⊕ | A⊖ → B⊕ | ∀⋄x A⊕ for ⋄ ∈ {∅,+,−,⊔}
A⊖ , B⊖ ::= at ( t ) | A⊖ ∧ B⊖ | A⊕ → B⊖ | ∀⋄x A⊖ for ⋄ ∈ {∅,+ }
One necessary change when adopting principles from NA is to replace CmpAx with a weak compatibility rule.
This is because Dialectica is unable to interpret full extensionality (cf. [18, 39]). We thus employ an upgraded variant
of the T -polymorphic CMP rule from [13]:
Γ⊖ ⊢l s =ρ t
CMPρ
Γ⊖ ⊢l B(s) → B(t)
(1)
where all formulas in Γ⊖ are refutation irrelevant .
Remark 1 (Contraction).
The computationally irrelevant contractions in NAl can safely be handled implicitly at →i . The situation is
different for those contractions whose formula is refutation relevant (i.e., the computationally relevant contractions),
as we wanted to automatically ensure that their translation is decidable (instead of leaving the task of decidability
check to the user). The decidability of their translation is necessary for attaining soundness.
We achieved this by including in NAl the contraction anti-rule Cl (see Table 4) for all formulas A that are refutation
relevant and (⋆) do not contain any ∀+ , nor ∀∅ . This triggered the addition to NA of an explicit (unrestricted)
contraction anti-rule C which is needed in the construction of the verifying proof (it only applies to quantifier-free
formulas | A | ). The restriction ⋆ ensured that all contraction formulas that require at least one challenger term for
their LD- interpretation would have quantifier-free (hence decidable) LD- translations.
For the (light) modal Dialectica we upgrade this purely syntactical criterion used in [17] (as inherited from [13]),
see Remark 3 at the end of Section 3.
9Note that for the universal quantification with combined positive/negative computational content we here use ∀ instead of the more verbose
∀± from [17] , as it should be clear from the meta-context whether an actual instance of ∀ is in an input proof (hence part of NAl ) or a verifying
proof (thus part of NA ). See also Footnote 10.
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Moreover, in order to avoid having any computationally relevant contractions implicitly at →i , we constrain the
deduction rules of NAl to disallow multiple occurrences of refutation relevant assumptions in any of the premise
sequents. Thus, whenever a double occurrence of a refutation relevant assumption is created in a conclusion sequent
by one of the binary rules of NAl , such sequent cannot be directly a premise for the application of an(other) NAl rule:
the anti-rule Cl must be applied first, in order to eliminate the critical double.
If ⋆ is not satisfied and yet a : A is a refutation relevant assumption occurring at least twice in some conclusion
sequent, this is a dead end: such sequent can only be the root of the NAl proof-(sub)tree.
While EFQ : ⊥ → A remains fully provable also in NAl (for all formulas A ∈ Fl ) the situation changes for
Stab : ¬¬A → A in the case of many formulas A that feature light quantifiers in certain places. As noted in [13], the
usual proof in NA of Stab (constructed by induction on A) makes unavoidably use of contractions over ¬¬(B ∧ C)
for subformulas (B ∧ C) of A , and these are subject to the ⋆ restriction for refutation relevant B ∧ C . Even when
such B ∧ C obey ⋆, they may lead to the failure of restrictions (+), (−) or (∅ ). On the other hand Stab is provable
in NAl for A ∈ F or A conjunction-free.
2. The light Dialectica interpretation (LD - interpretation)
With each formula A of NAl we associate its LD - translation: a not necessarily quantifier-free formula | A | xy of
NA where x , y are tuples of fresh variables, not appearing in A . The variables x in the superscript are called the
witness variables, while the subscript variables y are called the challenge variables.
Terms t substituting witness variables ( like | A | ty ) are called realizing terms or “witnesses” and terms s substi-
tuting challenge variables ( like | A | xs ) are called refuting terms or “challengers”. Intuitively, the LD - interpretation
of A can be viewed as a game in which first Eloise ( ∃ ) and then Abelard ( ∀ ) make one move each by playing
type-corresponding objects t and s for the tuples x and respectively y . Formula | A | xy specifies the “adjudication
relation”, here not necessarily decidable (as it were for pure Go¨del Dialectica): Eloise wins iff NA ⊢ | A | ts .
In the light context as well, Eloise has a winning move whenever A is provable in NAl : the LD-interpretation will
explicitly provide it from the input NAl proof of A as a tuple of witnesses t [such that FV ( t ) ⊆ FV ( A ) ] together
with the verifying proof in NA of ∀y | A | ty (Eloise wins by t regardless of the instances s for Abelard’s y ).
Definition 1 (light Dialectica translation of formulas, as introduced in [17]).
The interpretation does not change atomic formulas, i.e., | at ( tB ) | :≡ at ( tB ) . Assuming | A | xy and | B | uv are
already defined, | A ∧ B | x , uy , v :≡ | A |
x
y ∧ | B |
u
v
and | A → B | f , g
x , v
:≡ | A | xf x v → | B |
g x
v
. The
interpretation of the four universal quantifiers is (upon renaming, we assume that quantified variables occur uniquely
in a formula): [ note that cf. Definition 2 in Section 3 , |  ∀z A(z) | h ≡ ∀z, y | A(z) | hzy ]
| ∀z A(z) | h
z, y :≡ | A(z) |
hz
y | ∀+ z A(z) |
h
y :≡ ∀z | A(z) |
hz
y
| ∀− z A(z) | xz, y :≡ | A(z) |
x
y | ∀∅ z A(z) |
x
y :≡ ∀z | A(z) |
x
y
Since | ⊥ | ≡ ⊥ , we get | ¬B | V
u
≡ ¬ | B | uV u hence | ¬¬A |
X
Y ≡ ¬¬ | A |
X Y
Y ( X Y ) , and also
| ¬ ∀z A(z) | Z , Yh ≡ ¬ | A(Z h ) |
h (Z h )
Y h | ¬ ∀− z A(z) |
Z , Y
x
≡ ¬ | A(Z x ) | xY x
| ¬ ∀+ z A(z) | Yh ≡ ¬ ∀z | A(z) |
h z
Y h | ¬ ∀∅ z A(z) |
Y
x
≡ ¬ ∀z | A(z) | xY x
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It is straightforward to compute ( for weak existential counterparts ∃˜⋄ x :≡¬ ∀⋄x¬ with ⋄ ∈ { ∅ , + , − , } ) that
| ∃˜ z A(z) | Z , HY ≡ ¬¬ | A (Z Y ) |
H Y
Y (Z Y ) ( H Y ) | ∃˜+ z A(z) |
H
Y ≡ ∃˜z | A(z) |
H Y
Y z ( H Y )
| ∃˜− z A(z) | Z , HY ≡ ¬¬ | A (Z Y ) |
H Y
Y ( H Y ) | ∃˜ ∅ z A(z) |
H
Y ≡ ∃˜z | A(z) |
H Y
Y ( H Y )
The length and types of the witnessing and challenging tuples are uniquely determined for a given formula.
The following metatheorem gives the general pattern in which soundness theorems for Dialectica-based interpre-
tations can be expressed, in a Natural Deduction setting. Here the metavariables ISys and VSys stand for input and
respectively verifying systems.
Theorem 1 (general soundness for Dialectica interpretations; [ ISys, VSys ] ). Let A0 , A1 , . . . , An be a sequence
of formulas of ISys with w all their free variables. If the sequent a1 : A1 , . . . , an : An ⊢l A0 is provable in ISys ,
then terms t 0 , . . . , t n can be automatically synthesized from its formal proof, such that the translated sequent
a1 : | A1 |
x 1
t 1
, . . . , an : | An |
x n
t n
⊢ | A0 |
t 0
x 0
is provable in VSys , and the following free variable condition (c) holds: FV ( t i )⊆{w , x 0, . . . , x n} and x 0 < FV ( t 0 ) .
Here x 0, . . . , x n are tuples of fresh variables, such that equal avars share a common such tuple.
In [17] the above was thoroughly proved for ISys ≡ NAl and VSys ≡ NA , except for the interpretation of the
weak extensionality rule, which we present below. Further in the sequel we also give a much more detailed treatment
of the induction rule for numbers, in order to motivate the introduction of the modal induction rule in Section 4.1.
2.1. Light Dialectica treatment of extensionality
We here give the LD-interpretation of the weak compatibility rule
Γ⊖ ⊢l s =ρ r
CMPρ
Γ⊖ ⊢l B(s) → B(r)
where all formulas from Γ⊖ are refutation irrelevant, i.e., the negative position in their LD - translation is empty. By
definition of equality at higher types, s =ρ r is ∀ z . s z = r z , hence a purely universal formula. We are given that
a1 : | A1 |
x 1
t 1
, . . . , an : | An |
x n
t n
⊢ | A0 |
t 0
x 0
where | Γ⊖ | ≡ {a1, . . . , an } , t 0 ≡ t 1 ≡ . . . t n ≡ ⊔ (empty tuple) , A0 is s =ρ r and x 0 corresponds to z , thus the
above is more conveniently rewritten as
a1 : | A1 |
x 1 , . . . , an : | An |
x n
⊢ s x 0 = r x 0
To this we can apply the generalization rule, as x 0 are not free in the translated context | Γ⊖ | . Indeed, x 0 are fresh
variables and they could have appeared free only via terms t 1 , . . . , t n , were these not empty tuples (hence the need
for restricting the original context). We thus obtain | Γ⊖ | ⊢ s = r and further apply the extensionality Axiom to get
| Γ⊖ | ⊢ | B | (s) → | B | (r) . Note that the axiom is required here, as | Γ⊖ | may contain general formulas. With
g :≡ λ u . u and f :≡ λ u , v . v we have thus constructed a verifying proof
a1 : | A1 |
x 1 , . . . , an : | An |
x n
⊢ | B(s) | uf u v → | B(r) |
gu
v
[
≡ | B(s) → B(r) | f , g
u , v
]
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The new realizing terms f , g are closed, hence the free variable condition trivially holds. Note that f and g may at
most depend on the type ρ ( they do not depend on concrete terms s , r ) , see also the first example in Section 4.2.
2.2. Light Dialectica treatment of induction for natural numbers
Since the induction rule (for naturals) corresponds to an unbounded number of contractions of each assumption
from the step context ∆ (cf. [13], see Table 5), its clone in the system NAl is subject to a restriction like the one of
Cl. Namely, we need to require that all refutation relevant avars in ∆ satisfy ⋆.
Moreover, since the contractions on a ∈ Γ ∩ ∆ will be handled differently than for simple binary rules like →e
or ∧i , it is more convenient to require that naturals induction in NAl implicitly contracts all its refutation relevant
assumptions (instead of using the explicit Cl). We will use the notation Γ ⊎ ∆ for a special multiset union in which
refutation relevant assumptions appear only once, even if they appear in both Γ and ∆ . Thus the Ind Nl rule of NAl
is finally obtained by replacing ‘Γ , ∆ ’ with ‘Γ ⊎ ∆ ’ in the conclusion sequent of Ind N .
Γ ⊢l A(0 ) ∆ ⊢l A(n) → A(Sn)
Ind Nl
Γ ⊎ ∆ ⊢l A(n)
We are given
| Γ |
u
γ [ y ] ⊢ | A(0 ) |
r
y (2)
and
| ∆ |
z
δ [ x ; v ] ⊢ | A(n) |
x
t x v → | A(Sn) |
s x
v
(3)
We show that
∀ v
(
| Γ ⊎ ∆ |
u ⊎ z
ζ [n] v → | A(n) |
t′ [n]
v
)
(4)
is a theorem of NA , where
t′[n] :≡ R n r ( λn . s ) (5)
for every corresponding pair 〈r ∈ r / s ∈ s 〉 and ζ [n] will be constructed as functional terms depending on v . We
here intentionally use the same variable n that occurs freely in s and t . Implicitly, just t′ denotes t′ [n] . Also ζ will
be constructed as the collection of all ζ′ (corresponding to Γ \ ∆ ) and ζ′′ (corresponding to ∆ ).
Let b : B be a refutation relevant avar in Γ ⊎ ∆ . Let γ′ ∈ γ and / or δ′ ∈ δ be the challengers for b in Γ
and / or ∆ . If b appears only in Γ (hence not in ∆ ) we define
ζ′ [n] :≡ R n ( λ v . γ′ [v ] )
(
λ n , p, v . p ( t t′ v )
)
(6)
If b appears in ∆ , then the decidability of |B | is needed at each recursive step to equalize the terms p ( t t′ v )
obtained by the recursive call with the corresponding terms δ′ . Thus the right stop point of the backwards construction
is provided. In fact an implicit contraction over b happens at each inductive step and ⋆ guarantees that |B | is
decidable. For b ∈ Γ ∩ ∆ let
ζ′′ [n] :≡ R n
(
λ v . γ′ [v ]
) (
λ n , p , v . If ( | B | z
′
δ′ [ t′ ; v ] )
(
p ( t t′ v )
)
δ′ [ t′ ; v ]
)
(7)
and for b ∈ ∆ \ Γ we define its ζ′′ [n ] by replacing in (7) the γ′ with canonical zeros. Here z′ are the challenge
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variables corresponding to formula B . Notice that
⊢ t′ [ S n ] = s t′ [n ] (8)
⊢ ζ′ [ S n ] v = ζ′ [n ] ( t t′ v ) (9)
⊢ ζ′′ [ S n ] v = If ( | B | z
′
δ′ [ t′ ; v ] )
(
ζ′′ [n ] ( t t′ v )
)
δ′ [ t′ ; v ] (10)
We attempt to extend (9) to the whole ζ by proving from (10) the following
| B | z
′
ζ′′ [ S n ] v ⊢ ζ
′′ [ S n ] v = ζ′′ [n ] ( t t′ v ) (11)
We obtain this as an immediate consequence of
| B | z
′
ζ′′ [ S n ] v ⊢ | B |
z′
δ′ [ t′ ; v ] (12)
Assuming ¬| B | z
′
δ′ [ t′ ; v ] , by (10) we get ζ
′′ [ S n ] v = δ′ [ t′ ; v ] , hence ¬| B | z
′
ζ′′ [ S n ] v and thus
(12) follows via Stab (which is fully available in the verifying system).
We now prove ( 4 ) by an assumptionless induction on n . Let ζ∗ be the collection of all ζ′ and those ζ′′
corresponding to Γ ∩ ∆ . For n ≡ 0 it is sufficient that
| Γ |
u
ζ∗ [ 0 ] v ⊢ | A(0 ) |
t′ [ 0 ]
v
which follows from ( 2 ) since by definition ( 5 ) we have ⊢ t′ [ 0 ] = r and by definitions ( 6 ) and ( 7 ) we have
⊢ ζ∗ [ 0 ] = λ v . γ [v ] . Now given (4) we want to prove
| Γ ⊎ ∆ |
u ⊎ z
ζ [Sn ] v ⊢ | A(Sn) |
t′ [Sn ]
v
(13)
To (4) we apply ∀e[v 7→ t t′ v ] and via easy deductions in NA we get
| Γ ⊎ ∆ |
u ⊎ z
ζ [n ] ( t t′ v ) ⊢ | A(n) |
t′ [n ]
t t′ v (14)
With (9) and (11) we can rewrite (14) to
| Γ ⊎ ∆ |
u ⊎ z
ζ [ S n ] v ⊢ | A(n) |
t′ [n ]
t t′ v (15)
In (3) we substitute x 7→ t′ [n] and get
| ∆ |
z
δ [ t′ ; v ] ⊢ | A(n) |
t′ [n]
t t′ v → | A(Sn) |
s t′ [n]
v
which gives (13) by means of easy NA deductions using (8) , (12) and (15) .
Motivation for the modal induction rule
We have treated the most general situation, with all context sets Γ \ ∆ , Γ ∩ ∆ and ∆ \ Γ inhabited by refutation
relevant assumptions, and conclusion formula A accepting both witnesses and challengers. Many particular situations
amount to easier treatments, with simpler extracted terms. These can be obtained as simplifications of the general
witnesses and challengers presented above, by means of the reduction properties of the empty tuple, which was
denoted ǫ in [35]. We outline below only those particular cases which are relevant in connection with the modal
induction rule Indm
N
(cf. Section 4.1 further in the sequel) :
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• If Γ ∪ ∆ contains no refutation relevant assumption, but A(n) is refutation relevant, then terms t are no part
of the realizers for the conclusion sequent, in this case only t′ . Hence t would be redundantly produced and a
mechanism is needed to prevent their construction. This is ensured by  in front of the step A(n) at Indm
N
.
• If A(n) is refutation relevant, ∆ has no refutation relevant element but Γ is refutation relevant inhabited, then
δ and ζ′′ are empty. Yet ζ∗ ≡ ζ′ has to be produced as (6) and includes t [n] ; this no longer will be the
case for Indm
N
(cf. technical details at the end of Section 4.1 further in the sequel; challengers γ simply are
preserved for | Γ | ) .
• If A(n) is refutation irrelevant then v , t and t t′ v are empty tuples. Thus ζ′ ≡ γ′ and (7) simplifies to
[ recall that n < FV ( γ′ ) , n ∈ FV ( t′ ) , and possibly n ∈ FV ( δ′ ) ]
ζ′′ [n ] ≡ R n γ′
(
λ n , p . If
(
| B | z
′
δ′ [ t′ ]
)
p δ′ [ t′ ]
)
Intermezzo
In [37], the second author thoroughly presented how Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation can be completely decon-
structed from its full computational essence down to a symbolic null transformation (see also Chapter 5 of [38] for a
more comprehensive exposition, in particular Section 5.5.1, page 129). However, the flag apparatus for decorating10
both quantifiers and implications (throughout the input proofs) tends to become too complex for human operators (so
that Oliva’s detour to the linear logic substructure may appear as a better alternative).
We here propose a middle path between removing computational content of (‘computationally correct’) proofs via
the second author’s “deep annotation” mechanism and Oliva’s “shallow annotation” equivalent approach (see Section
6 of [37]). We will thus use  (a single switch) directly at the level of natural proofs. Although  cannot be
simulated within our previous light Dialectica (hence is a strict addition to our previous light Arithmetic), it certainly
is implementable within either of Trifonov’s or Oliva’s systems.
The purpose of our approach has been the rapid implementation in the actual MinLog system (cf. [34], in particular
the ‘Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation’ subsection of ‘Computational content of classical proofs’). Indeed,  was im-
plemented (in [34]) as “syntactic sugar” over the ‘non-computational’ implication −−> seen as Kreisel implication.11
By abuse of notation, in the sequel we will use the same ‘proof gates’ ⊢ and ⊢l as in the prequel, only now in
the new modal setting, as the actual affiliation of a formal (sub)proof is easily deducible from the meta-context. This
includes the deduction rules from the tables in Section 1.2, for which the constraints (that are outlined below each
table) smoothly adapt to the insertion of  (into the input system NAl , through i and AxT), as described in the
sequel. [ Our modal systems are normal according to the definition from [9] , and non-standard since the normality
scheme AxK is (syntactically) derivable from the axiom (scheme) AxT . ]
3. Modal system NAm and light modal system NAml
For the necessity operator  we have the following enhanced introduction rule, which admits many more premise
sequents than usual (as the context Γ may be inhabited, see also Remark 4 in Section 4 for an extended motivation):
i :
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A
,
10Note that in [38] (±) characterizes full lack of computational content and corresponds to (∅ ) here, (+) stands for partial content from the
negative side and corresponds to (−) here, and (−) from [38] denotes partial content from the positive side hence corresponds to (+) here. Basically
polarities were reversed by the second author (already since [37]) due to his reconstructive approach which is otherwise dual (for quantifiers) to our
constructive approach here. See also Footnote 2 on page 6 of [37] .
11Aside from the technical complexity of introducing a new logical operator symbol throughout the whole proof-system, Scheme’s call/cc
mechanism would be needed for a direct implementation of  (our dialect of choice for MinLog is [8]).
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where Γ is restricted depending on the (light) modal translation of the proof of A from Γ , in a way that is akin to the
condition (+) on the ∀i+ rule from page 6; see Definition 3 further below.
The following axioms of modal propositional logic S4 ( cf. [33], Chapter VII; see also Chapter 9 of [40] ) are part
of NAm and NAml :
AxT : A → A AxTc : A → ˜^ A
Ax4 : A →  A Ax4c : ˜^ ˜^A → ˜^ A
AxK : [  (A → B) ∧ A ] → B
In fact only AxT is needed as axiom of our non-standard modal systems. Of course, AxTc and Ax4c had been
syntactically deducible from AxT and respectively Ax4 already in the propositional modal system S4 , only using
minimal logic ( the proof of Ax4c also uses AxK and the empty-context i ). It turns out that also Ax4 and AxK
are easily deducible in NAm / NAml just from AxT (and only using minimal logic), given our very liberal necessity
introduction rule, see Definition 3 below. Note that Stability ¬¬B → B needs to be restricted already for NAm , due
to the necessary restriction on Contraction, see Remark 3 in the sequel and Remark 5 in Section 4.
We denote by A →k B :≡ A → B the so called ‘Kreisel implication’12, since its translation by (light) modal
Dialectica is akin to its Modified Realizability interpretation. Basically, if A is a formula in which all implications are
Kreisel ones, then the modal Dialectica interpretation of A is logically equivalent (provably in NA ) to the modified
realizability interpretation of A ; see Lemma 3.2 of [26] and also [29] .
Note that even though our Kreisel implication looks similar to the so-called ‘lax implication’ (cf. [30]-Section 7),
here we are not concerned with a standard (intuitionistic) modal logic (see Remark 5 at the end of Section 4 ). Ditto
for the (classical) translation of  under the Curry-Howard-style ‘modal functional interpretation’ of De Queiroz and
Gabbay (cf. [7], see also Section 7 of [6] for an updated survey) .
Definition 2 (modal Dialectica interpretation - translation of formulas). The interpretation does not change atomic13
formulas, i.e., | at ( tB ) | :≡ at ( tB ) . Assuming | A | xy and | B |
u
v
are already defined ,
| A ∧ B | x , uy , v :≡ | A |
x
y ∧ | B |
u
v
| ∀z A(z) | h
z , y :≡ | A(z) |
hz
y
| A → B | f , g
x , v
:≡ | A | xf x v → | B |
g x
v
| A | x :≡ ∀ y | A | xy
As an immediate consequence , |  ∀z A(z) | h ≡ ∀z , y | A(z) | h zy , | ¬B | u ≡ ¬∀ v | B |
u
v
and further
| ˜^ A ≡ ( ¬  ¬ A ) | f ≡ ∃˜ x | A | xf x
| A →k B ≡ ( A → B ) | gx , v ≡ ∀ y | A |
x
y → | B |
g x
v
| ¬  ∀z A(z) | h ≡ ¬∀z , y | A(z) |
h z
y
Recall from Definition 1 in Section 2 that | ∃˜ z A(z) | Z , HY ≡ ¬¬ | A (Z Y ) |
H Y
Y (Z Y ) ( H Y ) which we can compare
with | ∃˜ z  A(z) | z , x ≡ ¬¬ | A(z) | x ↔ NA | A(z) | x [ recall that ∃˜z A(z) :≡ ¬ ∀z ¬ A(z) ] or even
|  ∃˜ z A(z) | Z , H ≡ ∀ Y ¬¬ | A (Z Y ) | H YY (Z Y ) ( H Y ) ↔ NA ∀ Y | A (Z Y ) |
H Y
Y (Z Y ) ( H Y )
12See Section 3.2 of [28] for a sketch of this construct and its design difficulties within the multi-modal linear setting. See also [31], Chapter VII
“some other concepts of implication” for a discussion on notions of stronger implication which appeared since early research on modal logic.
13Any decidable formula can (and should) be given via its associated boolean term, e.g., one should rather use at (Odd(x)) instead of the more
verbose ∀y (2y , x ) , which is refutation relevant in a somewhat artificial and probably unintended way.
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Definition 3 (Necessity Introduction).
The restriction on i is relative to programs synthesized from the proof of the premise A of this Natural Deduction
rule , unless all formulas in the context Γ are refutation irrelevant or A is refutation irrelevant . Namely , with
Γ ≡ { a1 : A1 , . . . , an : An } and A ≡ A0 , the restriction is that x 0 < ∪ni=1 FV ( t i ) in the translated premise sequent
a1 : | A1 |
x 1
t 1
, . . . , an : | An |
x n
t n
⊢ | A0 |
t 0
x 0
. Thus admissible input proofs are inductively defined together with their
extracted programs [ and their corresponding translated (verifying) proofs].
Note that  could be defined in terms of →k as A ≡ (A →k ⊥) → ⊥ , since NA features full stability Stab.
Definition 4 (light modal Dialectica translation of formulas). The following are added to the above Definition 2
( the deduced translation of ∃˜ ∅ z is outlined below for use at the end of Section 4.2;cf. 2nd paragraph of Section 5) :
| ∀+ z A(z) | hy :≡ ∀z | A(z) |
hz
y | ∀− z A(z) |
x
z, y :≡ | A(z) |
x
y
| ∀∅ z A(z) | xy :≡ ∀z | A(z) |
x
y | ∃˜ ∅ z B(z) |
U
V ≡ ∃˜z | B(z) |
U V
V (U V )
The light modal translation of formulas only adds | A | x :≡ ∀y | A | xy to our light functional translation from [17].
The definition of computational relevance of (light) modal formulas A is basically the same as for non-modal
formulas, but relative to the enhanced syntactic context. Namely, A is realization relevant also under (light) modal
Dialectica if the tuple of witness variables x of its translation | A | xy is not empty and similarly A is refutation
relevant if the tuple of challenge variables y is not empty. (See Remark 1 in Section 3 of [17]). Correspondingly, A
is realization irrelevant if it is not realization relevant (i.e., x is an empty tuple), and A is refutation irrelevant if it is
not refutation relevant (i.e., y is an empty tuple). [ See also the more technical definition in Section 1.2 ]
Remark 2 (restriction violation for i). In an automatized interactive search for modal input proofs of some given
specification, we can temporarily allow unrestricted (or lesser restricted) instances of i and postpone the validity
check for when the proof of its premise is fully constructed. This approach would be similar to the ‘nc-violations’
check in the actual MinLog system, see [35], and to the so-called ‘computationally correct proofs’ from [38] .
For efficiency reasons, we recommend the use of modal operators whenever possible instead of the above partly
(or non) computational quantifiers ∀+ , ∀− , ∀∅ and ∃˜ ∅ .Thus it makes sense to study the (pure) modal Dialectica in
itself, as the use of such light quantifiers may not be necessary in many cases of interest.It should be easier to construct
a purely modal (i.e., without light quantifiers) input proof, also for a (semi) automated proof-search algorithm.
Nevertheless, it is the light variant of modal Dialectica which provides the larger range of possibilities, particularly
for situations where the simpler, ‘heavier’ modal Dialectica would not suffice.
Remark 3 (Contraction restriction). We upgrade the ⋆ restriction from [17] on the computationally relevant con-
tractions (those on refutation relevant open assumptions A), such that the interpretation |A | must be decidable (rather
than strictly quantifier-free).In the new modal context one needs to take into account also the translation of the neces-
sity operator, as this introduces new quantifiers. These may alter the decidability of the translated formula (relative to
the corresponding non-modal formula obtained by wiping out all instances of  ) .
E.g., let T (x, y, z) be a decidable predicate such that H(x, y) :≡ ∃˜z T (x, y, z) is not decidable [ e.g., take Kleene’s
T predicate which is expressible in Peano Arithmetic, hence also in NA , so that H expresses the Halting Problem
“program with code x halts on input y” ]. Then P(x) :≡ ∀y ∀z¬T (x, y, z) can be a contraction formula, whereas
P (x) :≡ ∀y  ∀z ¬T (x, y, z) cannot, as its translation is ∀z¬T (x, y, z) , an undecidable formula, since
NA ⊢ | P (x) | y ↔ ¬ H(x, y)
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On the other hand, both ∀z (3z , x) ∧ ∀y (2y , x) and ∀z (3z , x) ∧  ∀y (2y , x) can be contraction formulas,
as ∀y (2y , x) is decidable. Thus, given that there is no generic algorithm for the decidability of first-order formulas
over N , the user needs to supply a boolean term and a proof that the respective term is equivalent to the translation of
the contraction formula. E.g., add ∀y (2y , x) ↔ at (Odd(x)) as global assumption (cf. [34]), see also Footnote 13.
4. Modal and light modal functional interpretations
Below we prove that (meta-) Theorem 1 (see Section 2 on page 8) remains valid also for the pairs [ NAm , NA ]
(modal Dialectica) and [ NAml , NA ] (light modal Dialectica) , which share the same VSys ≡ NA .
Recall from Definition 3 of i that the (generic) restriction on the premise sequent is that x 0 < ∪ni=1 FV ( t i ) in its
modal functional translation a1 : | A1 |
x 1
t 1
, . . . , an : | An |
x n
t n
⊢ | A0 |
t 0
x 0
. This ensures that the introduction rule ∀i can
be applied for variables x 0 and thus the conclusion sequent a1 : A1 , . . . , an : An ⊢l A0 is witnessed by exactly the
same realizers as those constructed for the premise sequent Γ ⊢l A0 .
Lemma 1 (interpretation of S4 modal axioms). Axioms AxT, AxTc, Ax4, Ax4c and AxK are realizable in NA under
the (light) modal Dialectica translation.
Proof: The translation of AxT is | A → A | g
x , y ≡ ∀v | A |
x
v
→ | A | g xy and we can take g to be the identity
λ x . x . Similarly, the translation of AxTc is | A → ˜^ A | f
x , y ≡ | A |
x
f x y → ∃˜ u | A |
u
y and we can take f to be the
projection λ x y . y . For Ax4 and Ax4c it is immediate that | A | ≡ |  A | and also | ˜^ A | ≡ | ˜^ ˜^ A | , thus the
realizer is again the identity in both cases. In the translation of AxK below, we take U :≡ λ f , g , x . g x , which can
easily be proved to be a realizer.
|AxK | ≡ [ ∀ x , v ( | A | xf x v → | B |
g x
v
) ∧ ∀ y | A | x
′
y ]
f , g , x′
→ ∀ v′ | B | u
v′
≡
≡ [ ∀ x , v ( | A | xf x v → | B |
g x
v
) ∧ ∀ y | A | x
′
y → ∀ v
′ | B | U ( f , g , x
′ )
v′
] Uf , g , x′
Given the above Lemma and comments, we have completely established the following:
Theorem 2 (soundness of modal Dialectica). Theorem 1 [ NAm , NA ] .
Theorem 3 (soundness of light modal Dialectica). Theorem 1 [ NAml , NA ] .
The next result pictures the actual limits of our modal adaptation of Go¨del’s functional interpretation.
Theorem 4 (T−unrealizability of S5 defining axiom). Axiom Ax5 : ˜^ A →  ˜^ A is not realizable (in general)
under the (light) modal Dialectica translation (by primitive recursive functionals of finite type).
Proof: The translation of Ax5 is a formula of shape B( x) →∀ y B( y) which only holds true for minor particular
cases (e.g., when x is the empty tuple, special case when Ax5 requires no realizer at all).
Notice that ˜^ ∃˜ x A is akin to Berger’s uniform existence {∃ x} A from [2], where one does not care about the
witness for ∃ x (which is actually deleted from the extraction). We can thus see ˜^ as an extension of Berger’s
appliance to more general formulas than just existential ones.
On the other hand there are situations when  and ˜^ are too general contrivances and separate annotations for
each quantifier are a better answer for the problem at hand. In some of these cases it may still be possible to use the
modal operators if one changes the input specification and its proof.
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Remark 4 (Necessity Introduction revisited). The propositional restriction on the introduction rule for the necessity
operator is that all contextual assumptions had been discharged prior to the rule application (which would amount to
forcing Γ ≡∅ at our i ). In the natural deduction presentation of standard modal logic, i cannot be unrestricted or
A → A becomes a theorem, thus all occurrences of  becoming redundant. Our restriction on i is strictly weaker,
as, e.g., allows any context Γ whose formulas are all refutation irrelevant (this is akin to Prawitz’s ‘first version’ in
[31]VI.§1) and any context at all if the conclusion is refutation irrelevant. Thus, A → A not only is more generally
possible in our quantified modal systems, it even defines a quite interesting class of formulas, see below.
Definition 5 (necessary formulas). Formulas A such that ⊢ A → A in NAm or NAml .
Also due to AxT, it follows that ⊢ A ↔ A for any necessary formula, thus placing  in front of such A would be
logically redundant (this is akin to Prawitz’s “essentially modal” formulas in [31]VI.§2, ‘second version’).
We say that an occurrence of  is meaningful (i.e., non-redundant) in front of any formula that is not necessary.
Note that all refutation irrelevant formulas are necessary formulas. It is easy to see that some of the refutation
relevant formulas are necessary, e.g., ∀ x ⊥ and ∀ x ⊤ (in fact any A s.t. ⊢ A or ⊢ ¬ A in NAm or NAml ).
However, even if such formulas syntactically do require challengers, these functionals turn out to be redundant and
can be soundly discarded by a  , without the need to change any other component of the input proof. In fact, a
formula A is necessary iff it can be proved equivalent (in NAm or NAml ) to a refutation irrelevant formula B. Indeed,
for a necessary A take B :≡ A . For the converse we can use the long implication A → B → B → A , where for
the last implication a contextless i together with AxK was used. [ see also [31]VI.§2 for modally closed formulas]
Therefore, the ‘necessary’ class captures those formulas whose negative computational content can always be
erased regardless of the context in which they are used. On the other hand, there are cases when  can soundly be
applied to a non-necessary formula, leading to cleaner (and thus better) extracted programs (see Section 4.2 below).
Remark 5 (non-standard modal). It would appear that our Arithmetic NAm is able to prove new modal theorems
and even sentences that are invalid in Schu¨tte’s semantics. On the other hand, our ⋆ restriction is not present in the
usual first-order modal logic systems, thus some of the classical modal theorems will no longer be theorems of NAm .
Yet we suspect we are not far from Prawitz’s VI.§4 ‘fourth version’ for C′S5 with discharge function for normalization.
The Barcan formula ∀zA(z) →  ∀z A(z) is inadmissible in our modal systems (it is T-unrealizable in general,
similar to Ax5); although invalid in Schu¨tte’s S ⋆4 (cf. Anmerkung at the end of [33].I.§3), it is provable in Prawitz’s
CS5 for modally closed A (see page 78 of [31]VI.§2). However, the Converse Barcan formula  ∀z A(z) → ∀zA(z)
is admissible (it is bluntly realizable, similiar to AxT). We thus suspect that some form of an increasing domain
semantics will be suitable for our systems; see Sections 2.5 and 2.9 of [5].
4.1. Modal induction rule
As first argued in [16], induction (for natural numbers, but more generally also for lists, as naturals N are a par-
ticular case of inductively defined lists) should rather be treated in a Modified Realizability style whenever possible
under Dialectica extraction. In our non-standard modal context we can introduce the following modal induction rule
of systems NAm and NAml , which is defined with a Kreisel implication at the step:
Γ ⊢ A(0 )  ∆ ⊢ A(n) → A(Sn)
Ind
m
N
Γ ,  ∆ ⊢ A(n)
This is an upgrade of the similar rule from [16] (given at the linear logic level, see also [28]), as it allows for non-
empty contexts. While the base context Γ is unrestricted, the step context ∆ is made entirely of refutation irrelevant
assumptions of shape  D. Thus the step context restriction as for Ind Nl (see Section 2.2) is bluntly satisfied,
since this only concerned refutation relevant assumptions (whose translations in NA had to be quantifier-free, as
their decidability was needed for case distinction in their corresponding challenge realizers). Note that if D already
is refutation irrelevant, placing  in front of D is somewhat redundant. We could refine Indm
N
by splitting the step
context into ∆′ which consists of refutation irrelevant assumptions not of shape D and ∆′′ ≡ ∆ . Nonetheless
such ∆′ would only contain necessary formulas (cf. Definition 5).
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The treatment of Indm
N
under (light) modal Dialectica is much easier than the one of Ind Nl . In fact IndmN
is a good simplification of Ind Nl for situations when the whole context is made entirely of refutation irrelevant
assumptions but A(n) is a refutation relevant formula. The challenger for A(n) in the step conclusion would
be unneededly produced during the treatment of such Ind Nl , as it becomes no part of any of the witnesses for the
conclusion sequent. Placing  in front of the negatively positioned A(n) thus ensures a minimal optimization brought
by Indm
N
, in this particular case simply by elimination of redundancy: the conclusion witnessing terms are the same
as for Ind Nl ( see also the comments at the end of Section 2.2).
A more serious optimization concerns the challengers of |C | for refutation relevant assumptions C from the Γ
context. These are simply preserved by Indm
N
, while under Ind Nl they had to include the challengers for the step
A(n) . If A(n) were refutation irrelevant, it would still make sense to use Indm
N
instead of Ind Nl , if one is not
interested in the challengers for the refutation relevant assumptions from the step context. While for such particular
instances of Ind Nl we already have the preservation of challengers for refutation relevant assumptions strictly from Γ ,
still challengers for the refutation relevant step assumptions are more complex in the conclusion sequent (they include
a meaningful Go¨del recursion, even though here a challenger for the step negative A(n) is no longer comprised since
it does not exist). Thus Indm
N
can bring an improvement over Ind Nl by wiping out the step challengers altogether,
should these not be needed in the global construction of the topmost realizers for the goal specification.
It turns out that Indm
N
strictly optimizes Ind Nl in many (if not most) situations. Yet Ind Nl will have to be used
also in our non-standard modal context, practically whenever Indm
N
simply cannot be applied for the goal at hand.
Modal induction rule - technical details
We are given both the following
| Γ |
u
γ
⊢ ∀ y | A(0 ) | ry (16)
|  ∆ |
z
⊢ ∀ y′ | A(n) | xy′ → | A(Sn) |
s x
v
Since v < FV ( |  ∆ | z ) and v < FV ( ∀ y′ | A(n) | xy′ ) from the latter we easily obtain
|  ∆ |
z
⊢ ∀ y′ | A(n) | xy′ → ∀ v | A(Sn) |
s x
v
(17)
With t [n ] :≡ R n r ( λn . s ) for every corresponding pair 〈r ∈ r / s ∈ s 〉 we show by induction on n in NA
with base context | Γ | uγ and step context |  ∆ |
z that
| Γ |
u
γ
, |  ∆ |
z
⊢ ∀ v | A(n) | t [n]
v
As t [0 ] ≡ r the base is given by (16) and the step follows from (17) with x 7→ t [n] since t [Sn] ≡ s t [n] .
Thus challengers γ are simply preserved for | Γ | and witnesses t [n] are easily constructed for | A(n) | in the
conclusion sequent of Indm
N
.
Remark 6. Our modal induction rule is equivalent to a special case of Ind N , since a  can be placed in front of
A(S n) from the step sequent of Indm
N
. The equivalence of the two formulations for the step sequent can easily be
proved using AxT , Ax4 , AxK and i. Extracted terms are the same and the verifying proof only gets more direct.
4.2. Past examples revisited
The weak extensionality of modal input systems NAm and NAml can better be expressed by means of the following
modal compatibility axiom (the usual compatibility axiom, but with the outward implication changed to a Kreisel
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implication; see also the Introduction of [28] for the akin formulation in linear logic using a ‘Kreisel modality’ !k )
CmpAxm :  ( x =ρ y ) → B( x ) → B( y)
By straightforward calculations, it is easy to see that CmpAxm is realizable under (light) modal Dialectica by simple
projection functionals, with the verification in the fully extensional NA given by the corresponding compatibility
axiom CmpAx . The realizing terms are same f , g as for CMPρ at the end of Section 2.1, here just grouped in tuples.
In [16] the following class of examples was considered: theorems of the form
∀ x A → ∀ y B → ∀ z C (18)
possibly with parameters, where the negative information on x is irrelevant, while the one on y is of our interest.
Then it must be possible to adapt the proof of (18) to a proof in NAm or NAml of ( ∀ x A ) → ∀ y B → ∀ z C .
As noticed by Oliva in [28], the Fibonacci example first treated with Dialectica in [14] falls into this category.
Oliva also suggested an interesting example, which motivated the definition of our positively computational quan-
tifier ∀+ ( see Definition 1 and also Definition 4): “Any infinite set P of natural numbers (with decidable membership)
contains elements which are arbitrarily far apart”. The claim can be formalized (in an extension of NA with proper
predicate symbols) as follows:
∀ x ∃˜y
(
y > x ∧ P(y)
)
→ ∀d ∃˜ n1 , n2
(
n2 > n1 + d ∧ P(n1) ∧ P(n2)
)
This statement can be proved only via a contraction on the premise, and as a result (the negative universally quantified)
x gets refuted by a term involving case distinction on |P | . However, if only the witnesses of n1 and n2 are needed,
then the redundant challenge for x can simply be discarded by means of a  in front of the premise, effectively
applying a Kreisel implication. This example is of the form (18) and was extensively treated in Section 4 of [17] . It
can even be treated with the hybrid Dialectica from [16] ; here we only bring the more instrumental solution.
The example can be extended so that the premise becomes more involved (cf. [38], Example 5.3 on page 114):
∀m
(
∃˜n Q(n,m) → ∃˜n1 Q(n1, Sm)
)
→
(
∃˜n0 Q(n0, 0 ) → ∃˜n2 Q(n2, S S 0 )
)
(19)
Again, a contraction must be used, and two semi-computational quantifiers need to be applied in order to erase the
negative computational content. The light specification corresponding to (19) would then be written as:
∀+m
(
∃˜+ n Q(n,m) → ∃˜ n1 Q(n1, Sm)
)
→ ∃˜ n0 Q(n0, 0 ) → ∃˜ n2 Q(n2, S S 0 )
However, this solution is not desirable, as the light annotations would only apply to a special class of binary relations
Q for which the witness n1 for Q(n1, Sm) does not depend computationally on the witness n for Q(n,m) for any
m , hence reducing the generality of the claim. One of the solutions would be to extend the light annotations to
implications as in [38]. However, a much simpler and more elegant approach is to use a Kreisel implication, by
placing a  in front of ∀m
(
∃˜n Q(n,m) → ∃˜n1 Q(n1, Sm)
)
at (19) . The negative content of the main premise will
thus be fully erased and the positive one will be fully preserved, achieving a Modified Realizability effect.
We also treat an artificial proof for the ‘integer root example’ (first considered in [3]): “every unbounded integer
function has an integer root function”. The statement can be formalized (in negative arithmetics) as follows:
∀x ∃˜y
(
f (y) > x
)
→ ∀m
(
f (0 ) ≤ m → ∃˜n
(
f (n) ≤ m < f (Sn)
) )
(20)
The claim can be proved by contradiction using n-induction for the formula f (n) ≤ m . However, in addition to
computing the integer root, the (heavy) Dialectica also extracts a complex recursive counterexample for x , with a case
distinction on each step (cf. [38] , section 3.2). This term challenges the outermost premise ∀x ∃˜y ( f (y) > x ) which
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actually constitutes the refutation relevant context shared by both the base and the step formulas of the induction.
The undesired negative content can be erased by ‘Kreisel-izing’ the outermost implication of (20) , thus converting
the context to a necessary one, hence allowing for the application of the modal induction rule. As a result, only the
integer root gets synthesized ( the realizer for n as function of m ) and additional artifacts are omitted. Note that,
in contrast to the previous two examples, this proof is intrinsically classical, so Modified Realizability alone is not
applicable in this case. However, using ∀+ x would still achieve the same cleaning effect (cf. [38] , section 5.6.1) .
Conclusion
4.3. Proof that  is a strict addition to the light system
The (modal) translation of an input schemata
(
∀n ∃˜m A(m, n) → ∀n ∃˜m B(m, n)
)
→k ¬ ∀kC(k) with decidable
predicates A, B,C is ∀h, n [ A(h(ghn), ghn)→ B( f hn, n) ] → ¬C(K f g) , where K is the witness varible and f , g are
challenge variables. Such specification cannot be produced by means of light quantifier decorations of the schemata(
∀n ∃˜m A(m, n) → ∀n ∃˜m B(m, n)
)
→ ¬ ∀kC(k) . Below is the small MinLog program that was used to carry out the
modal translation; the raw MinLog output has been processed for readability. [ e.g., @@ binds a (long) pair of types ]
(load "C:\\minlog\\initDan.scm") ; initial system load, adapted to Windows pathnames
(load "C:\\minlog\\etsmd.scm") ; library for modal Dialectica that adapts src/etsd.scm
(libload "nat.scm") ; library for naturals that also defines n, m, k of type ‘nat’
(add-predconst-name "A" "B" (make-arity (py "nat") (py "nat")))
(add-predconst-name "C" (make-arity (py "nat"))) ; no computational vars for predconsts
;; (add-variable "f" "g" (py "((nat=>nat)=>nat=>nat)"))
;; (add-variable "h" (py "nat=>nat")) ; below ‘F’ is MinLog’s decidable falsum
(define oG (pf "(all n ex m A m n -> all n ex m B m n) --> (all k C k -> F) "))
(define mdoG (formula-to-md-formula oG)) ; (pretty-print mdoG)
; (add-variable "K" (py "(((nat=>nat)=>nat=>nat)@@((nat=>nat)=>nat=>nat)=>nat)"))
;;; ex K all f,g { all h,n [ A(h (g h n) , g h n) -> B(f h n, n) ] -> C (K f g) -> F }
4.4. Illustrative example: finitary Infinite Pigeonhole Principle
As refreshed case study, let us consider the Infinite Pigeonhole Principle (cf. [32]). In his PhD thesis (cf. Chapter
5 of [38] , in particular Section 5.6.2) the second author explains that three uniform quantifiers need to be inserted in
order to remove the negative computational content from three universally quantified formulas inside the proof14. It
turns out that this can be achieved by inserting a single  in the formulation of the corollary he is proving (Unbounded
Pigeonhole Principle). [ in front of the conjunction Decr(l, n) ˜∧Same(l, n) , see Corollary 3.6 on page 63 of [38] ]
The treatment of the example now becomes simpler, with the same extracted term displayed by Trifonov in his
thesis. The advantage of modal Dialectica is that in the proof one only needs to check the uniformity condition once
for the  ( logically pushed in front of Decr(l, n) ˜∧Col(l, n) from the intermediate lemma ) rather than two times for
∀∅ introductions. The paradigm here is that one can outline the optimizations “en masse” rather than piece by piece.
Note that the program (manually) extracted by Trifonov basically is the same as the one described by Kohlenbach
in Section 11.4 of [19] by means of Oliva’s finite bar recursion, cf. Section 2.1 of [25]. The first author carried out
the implementation in MinLog by means of the Kreisel implication and automatically obtained the bettered Scheme
program from Figure 5.3 of [38].15
14Note that the program in Figure 5.3 of [38] is a hand-compiled version of the expression of Table 5.3. I.e., they denote one and the same
program, but in Table 5.3 the extraction of the term is shown in a stepwise manner, so that every step can be related to the proof and to the
interpretation. Figure 5.3 represents an operationally cleaner Scheme program. There is no normalization happening between Table 5.3 and Figure
5.3: Trifonov avoided it, as (uncontrolled) normalization can produce a slower program.
15At the moment of writing, the MinLog implementation of ∀∅ is not completely operational for proofs involving case distinction (for naturals)
like the one produced by the second author for comparison with the (sleeker for the finitary pigeonhole principle) A-translation approach. The first
author rearranged the input specification so that two → can be rewritten as →k , otherwise the input proof essentially is the same as Trifonov’s.
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Modal Dialectica provides the means of using both Modified Realizability and Go¨del’s Dialectica at the same time
for more efficient program extraction. This was already the case for the hybrid Dialectica of [16], but here we avoid the
detour to the linear logic substructure. Disregarding the light quantifiers, modal Dialectica represents (directly at the
supra-linear level) a good combination of the original proof interpretations, with the possibility of carrying out both
in a sound way on certain input proofs, insofar as some implications of the input specification can be ‘Kreisel-ized’.
At the extreme, Modified Realizability is obtained from Dialectica, see also the comments above Definition 2 . E.g.,
| (A →k B) →k C | Hg , p ≡ ∀ x , v | A →k B |
g
x , v
→ |C | H gp
≡ ∀ x , v
(
∀ y | A | xy → | B |
g x
v
)
→ |C | H gp (21)
Why not invoke a Modified Realizability (MR) extraction procedure for B → C instead of processing B →k C ? Per
se, MR requires strong existential quantification; even in combination with (refined) A-translation (cf. [4]), restrictions
are in place for the shape of the goal formula. Thus it is modal Dialectica that provides the fully modular approach.
E.g., the Dialectica extracted term from the (classical) proof of IPP (Infinite Pigeonhole Principle) can be (re)used
further in the synthesis of programs that employ IPP as lemma (such as the Unbounded Pigeonhole Principle).
5. Future investigative directions
A natural continuation of the work reported in this paper concerns the addition to our input systems of strong
(intuitionistic) elements. Besides the strong ∃ and its light associated ∃ ∅ (originally from [13] where it was denoted
∃ , see also [38] ), strong possibility ^ also needs to be considered as the intuitionistic dual of necessity  .
The following clauses would then be added to Definition 2 for getting the strong modal Dialectica interpretation
| ∃ z A(z) | z, fy :≡ | A(z) | fy and | ^A | y :≡ ∃ x | A | xy , and further | ∃ ∅ z A(z) | xy :≡ ∃ z | A(z) | xy to Definition 4 in
order to obtain the strong light modal Dialectica interpretation.
Intuitionistic (light) modal arithmetical systems will first be considered at input for ‘strong’ program synthesis.
Then their enhanced classical counterparts will be interpreted, modulo some negative translation. Such systems will
soundly extend NAm with ^ and ∃ , and NAml also with ∃ ∅ . Nevertheless, certain restrictions may need to be
applied on NAm and / or NAml before attempting such extensions with intuitionistic elements. ( See, e.g., [36] , in
particular Chapters 4 and 7 for an intuitionistic account of intuitionistic modal logic. )
In section 3.2 of [28] Oliva suggested labelled contexts in order to deal with the technical difficulties of having
both the Kreisel and the usual (Go¨del) implications in intuitionistic logic ILω . Our implementation in MinLog of
→k identifies those “Kreisel” assumptions as the ones discharged at −−> introduction; they are marked so that no
realizer is extracted for their negative side. In the modal language, we can say that they are “boxed” by means of
 , which acts as a “Kreisel” label. The restriction from Definition 3 then has to be checked for the proof of the
premise of an −−> elimination. It is straightforward that the hybrid system with →k is fully expressible in NAm ; the
question is whether NAm could nicely be expressed in a system with the Kreisel implication as primitive, given that
| A | ↔ NA | (A →k ⊥) → ⊥| . Perhaps a Kreisel negation ¬k were more suitable, with | ¬k A | ↔ NA | (A →k ⊥) | .
Last but not least, the design of the monotone variant of modal Dialectica is under consideration, since it has
been known for some time that a (heterogeneous) combination of modified realizability and classical Dialectica was
successfully used by Leus¸tean for proof mining ( cf. [19] ) an exceptional approximation result in metric fixed-point
theory ( cf. [21, 22] ). ( See also [15] for a synthetic analysis of the impact of the precursor of  into Kohlenbach’s
advanced framework for Proof Mining ; note that our base logical framework is equivalent to the one used by the proof
miners, cf. Section 1.1.11 of [39], see also [23] )
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Appendix
;; Unbounded (Infinite) Pigeonhole Principle, adapted by Hernest from Trifonov’s 2009
;; incomplete solution. We here follow the methodic approach exposed in Trifon’s thesis,
;; but with the optimization brought by modal Dialectica (via impnc), rather than allnc
(load "C:\\minlog\\initDan.scm") ;; init for Windows pathnames
(load "C:\\minlog\\etsmd.scm") ;; modal Dialectica extraction module
(set! COMENTARIU #f) (set! COMMENT-FLAG #f)
(libload "nat.scm"); symbols ‘m’, ‘n’, ‘k’ of type nat and rudimentary naturals operations
(libload "list.scm"); elementary operations on lists algebra, mainly over naturals algebra
(add-var-name "b" (py "nat")) ;; symbol for a variable color between 0 and k-1
(add-var-name "f" (py "nat=>nat")) ;; symbol for tapes, i.e., infinite sequences of colors
(add-var-name "l" (py "list nat")) ;; variable symbol for lists of natural numbers
;; ‘Finite Colouring’ : tape f is constrained to feature only colors 0,..,(k-1)
(define FC ;; ‘there are at most k colors on the tape f’, free variables ‘k’ and ‘f’
(pf " all n. f n < k ")); below ‘F’ is MinLog’s decidable falsum atom(ff), boolean ‘ff’
(define notFC (pf " (all n. f n < k) -> F ")) ;; negation of ‘FC’, free vars ‘k’ and ‘f’
;; ‘Infinite Colouring with b’: the color b occurs infinitely often on tape f
(define INFCb ;; bound variable ‘m’ here is essentially computational under Dialectica
(pf "all n. all m (n <= m -> f m = b -> F) -> F")) ;; free variables ‘b’ and ‘f’
(define notINFC ;; universally closed for ‘b’ negation of ‘INFCb’, with ‘f’ still free
(pf "all b. (all n. all m (n <= m -> f m = b -> F) -> F) -> F"))
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; Infinite Pigeonhole Principle, here negatively expressed for a proof by contradiction
(define IPH (make-all (pv "f") (make-imp notINFC notFC))) ; if tape f has no infinite
; monochromatic subsequence, then it is not finitely coloured; free var ‘k’ in notFC only
(define STLZ (pf "(all l . Lh l = Succ n -> ;; there is a list l of length n+1 containing
(all m . m < n -> (Succ m thof l) < (m thof l)) --> ;; different indices of occurrence
(all m . m < n -> f(m thof l) = f(Succ m thof l)) --> F) -> F ")); of the same color
(define notSTLZ (pf "all l . Lh l = Succ n -> ;; the free variables are ‘f’ and ‘n’
(all m . m < n -> (Succ m thof l) < (m thof l)) --> ;; ‘m’ needs not be realized
(all m . m < n -> f(m thof l) = f(Succ m thof l)) --> F ")) ; Kreisel implication(s)
(define STLZb (pf "all n. (all l . Lh l = Succ n -> ;; finite monochromatic subsequences
(all m . m < n -> (Succ m thof l) < (m thof l)) --> ; of arbitrary length weakly exist
(all m . m < Succ n -> f(m thof l) = b) --> F) -> F ")) ;; for color b and tape f
(define Goal (mk-imp INFCb STLZb)) ;; free variables ‘b’ and ‘f’ to be universally closed
(define FinalGoal (mk-all (pv "k") (pv "n") (pv "f") (mk-imp notSTLZ notFC)))
(add-rewrite-rule (pt "NegConst (NegConst boole^)") (pt "boole^")) ;; Boolean Stability
(add-rewrite-rule (pt "ImpConst boole^ False") (pt "NegConst boole^")) ;; simplification
(set-goal IPH)
(ind) ; induction on the number of colors ‘k’
(strip) ; minimal logic proof (search) wrongly produces a proof with free variable ‘n’
(use 2 (pt "0")) ; this is a manual bug-fix for (modal) Dialectica program extraction
; simple base case, now to the step case
(assume "k" "IH" "f" "NotINFC" "FCSucck")
(use "NotINFC" (pt "k"))
(assume "n" "nIsLastForK")
;; IH is: all f (all b exca n all m (n<=m -> f m=b -> F) -> all n f n<k -> F)
(use "IH" (pt "[n1]f(n max n1)")) ; var f is instantiated with (lambda n1. f(n max n1))
(ng) ;------------------------------------- normalize the current goal
(assume "b" "u") ;; assumption u is: all n0 exca m (n0<=m ! f(n max m)=b), ‘!’ is &ca
(use "NotINFC" (pt "b"))
(assume "n1" "u1") ;; assumption u1 is: all m (n1<=m -> f m=b -> F)
(use "u" (pt "n1"))
(assume "m" "n1<=m" "f(n max m)=b")
(use "u1" (pt "n max m"))
(use "NatLeTrans" (pt "m")); all nat1,nat2,nat3(nat1<=nat2 -> nat2<=nat3 -> nat1<=nat3)
(use "n1<=m")
(use "NatMaxUB2") ;; all nat1,nat2 (nat2 <= (nat1 max nat2))
(use "f(n max m)=b")
(ng) ;------------------------------------- normalize the current goal
(assume "n1")
;"all nat1,nat2 (nat1<Succ nat2 -> (nat1<nat2 -> Pvar) -> (nat1=nat2 -> Pvar) -> Pvar)"
(use "NatLtSuccCases" (pt "f(n max n1)") (pt "k"))
(use "FCSucck") ;; all n (f n < Succ k)
(search) ;; quick automated proof-search in minimal quantifier logic
(assume "f(n max n1)=k")
(use "Efq") ;; Ex Falso Quodlibet is a ‘global assumption’ simulating ‘F -> Pvar’
(use "nIsLastForK" (pt "n max n1")) ; all m (n<=m -> f m=k -> F)
(use "NatMaxUB1") ;; all nat1,nat2 (nat1 <= nat1 max nat2)
(use "f(n max n1)=k")
(save "IPH")
;------------------------------------- proof of Infinite Pigeonhole finished and saved
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(set! COMMENT-FLAG #t)
(set! ETSMD-LET-ENABLED #t)
(define extr_term-iph
(proof-to-extracted-md-term
(nbe-normalize-proof (expand-theorems (theorem-name-to-proof "IPH")))))
(define nterm-iph (nbe-normalize-term extr_term-iph))
; (pretty-print nterm-iph) ; 115 lines - functional for Infinite Pigeonhole principle
(add-program-constant "mdIPH" (term-to-type nterm-iph))
(define (animate-iph)
(add-computation-rule "mdIPH k f"
(nbe-normalize-term (mk-term-in-app-form nterm-iph (pt "k") (pt "f")))))
(define (deanimate-iph)
(remove-computation-rules-for (pt "mdIPH k f")))
(set! COMMENT-FLAG #f)
(set-goal Goal) ; if color b appears infinitely often on tape f then it occurs
; finitely often, i.e, for any n there (weakly) exists a list l of length n+1 of
; indices l_0,..,l_n pointing to b-coloured cells of f, i.e., f(l_m)=b, m in [0..n]
(assume "f" "b" "Infb") ;; Infb is: all n exca m (n<=m ! f m=b)
(ind) ; base case of induction on n, i.e., list length minus one
(assume "NotSTLZero") ;; NotSTLb with b replaced by zero, i.e., (pt "0")
(use "Infb" (pt "0"))
(assume "m" "0<=m" "f m=b")
(use "NotSTLZero" (pt "m:"))
(use "Truth-Axiom")
(normalize-goal)
(assume "m1")
(use "Efq") ;----------------- first use of ‘boolean’ Ex Falso
(cases) ;; proof by case distinction, here for naturals algebra, hence 0 vs. > 0
(strip) ;; give up the dummy premise in ‘?_13: 0<1 -> f(0 thof m:)=b’
(use "f m=b") ;; since the zero-th element of the singleton list ‘m:’ is ‘m’
(normalize-goal)
(assume "m1")
(use "Efq") ;; finished base case of ‘n’-induction, now proceed to step case
(assume "n" "IH" "NotSTLZ")
(use "IH")
(cases) ;; proof by case distinction, here for lists algebra, hence nil vs. non-nil
(normalize-goal)
(use "Efq") ;----------------- third use of ‘boolean’ Ex Falso
(assume "m" "l")
(assume "Lh l=n") ;; length of list l is n
(assume "lIsDecreasing") ;; indexes from ‘l’ are (strictly) decreasing, hence different
(assume "lIsMonochrome") ;; indexes from list l point to a monochromatic subsequence
(use "Infb" (pt "Succ m"))
(assume "m1" "m<m1" "f m1=b")
(use "NotSTLZ" (pt "m1::m::l")); NotSTLZ for (cons m1 (cons m l)), a list of length n+2
(use "Lh l=n")
(cases) ;; proof by naturals case distinction
(assume "0 < Succ n") ;; discard dummy premise
(use "NatSuccLeToLt") ;; all nat1,nat2 ((Succ nat1) <= nat2 -> nat1 < nat2)
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(use "m<m1")
(use "lIsDecreasing")
(cases) ;; proof by naturals case distinction
(assume "0 < Succ(Succ n)") ;; discard dummy premise
(use "f m1=b")
(use "lIsMonochrome")
(save "Goal")
;--------------------------------------- intermediate Goal proof completed and saved
(set! COMMENT-FLAG #t)
(set! ETSMD-LET-ENABLED #t)
(define extr_term-g (proof-to-extracted-md-term
(nbe-normalize-proof (expand-theorems (theorem-name-to-proof "Goal")))))
(add-program-constant "mdGoal" (term-to-type extr_term-g))
; (pretty-print extr_term-g) ; 38 lines
; (define nterm-g (nbe-normalize-term extr_term-g))
; (pretty-print nterm-g) ; 13 lines
(define (animate-goal) (add-computation-rule "mdGoal f k"
(nbe-normalize-term (mk-term-in-app-form extr_term-g (pt "f") (pt "k")))))
(define (deanimate-goal)
(remove-computation-rules-for (pt "mdGoal f k")))
(set! COMMENT-FLAG #f)
(set-goal FinalGoal); no monochromatic subsequence of length n+1, then >k colors on f
(assume "k" "n" "f" "NotSTLZ" "FC")
(use "IPH" (pt "k") (pt "f")); use lemma IPH with given arguments from actual context
(assume "b" "Infb")
(use "Goal" (pt "f") (pt "b") (pt "n")); use Goal with arguments from updated context
(use "Infb")
(assume "l" "Lh l=Succ n" "lIsDecreasing" "lIsMonochrome")
(use "NotSTLZ" (pt "l"))
(use "Lh l=Succ n")
(use "lIsDecreasing")
(assume "m" "m<n")
(use "NatEqTrans" (pt "b")); all nat1,nat2,nat3 (nat1=nat2 -> nat2=nat3 -> nat1=nat3)
(use "lIsMonochrome")
;- use transitivity of ‘<’ ; all nat1,nat2,nat3 (nat1<nat2 -> nat2<nat3 -> nat1<nat3)
(use "NatLtTrans" (pt "Succ m")) ;; nat1 := Succ m; automatic bindings for nat2, nat3
(use "Truth-Axiom")
(use "m<n")
(use "NatEqSym"); symmetry of ‘=’ for naturals: all nat1,nat2 (nat1=nat2 -> nat2=nat1)
(use "lIsMonochrome")
(use "m<n")
(use "FC")
(save "FinalGoal")
(set! COMMENT-FLAG #t)
(set! ETSMD-LET-ENABLED #t)
(define extr_term-km
(proof-to-extracted-md-term (theorem-name-to-proof "FinalGoal")))
(nldisplay (type-to-string (term-to-type extr_term-km)))
; (pretty-print extr_term-km) ; 5 lines
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;===============================
; Trifon’s TEST and Dan’s Random
;===============================
; generate a list of 2^n infinite sequences starting with all possible variations
; of n booleans and continuing with #f, i.e., 0 (also 1 is used for #t)
(define (generate-seq n)
(if (= n 0)
(list (lambda (n) 0))
(foldr (lambda (x l)
(cons (lambda (n) (if (= n 0) 0 (x (- n 1))))
(cons (lambda (n) (if (= n 0) 1 (x (- n 1))))
l))) ’() (generate-seq (- n 1)))))
; generate one sequence of colors 0 .. (k-1) with initial k^n
; elements randomly generated and continuing with color 0
(define (grand-itm k) (if (and (fxpositive? k) (> k 1))
(rand-itm k) (myerror "grand-itm: not exact positive arg or k=1")))
(define (rand-itm k) (fxmodulo (random (most-positive-fixnum)) k))
(define (grand-seq k n) (if (and (fxpositive? k) (> k 1) (fxpositive? n))
(rand-seq k (expt k n))
(myerror "grand-seq: not exact positive args or k=1")))
(define (rand-seq k e) (first (lambda (m) (rand-itm k)) e))
(define (seq-fn seq) (let*((fxv (list->fxvector seq))
(len (fxvector-length fxv)))
(lambda (m) (if (< m len)
(fxvector-ref fxv m) 0))))
; return a list of (f 0), (f 1) ,..., (f n-1)
(define (first f n)
(if (= n 0) ’() (cons (f 0) (first (lambda (n) (f (+ n 1))) (- n 1)))))
; test a Scheme program on a list of infinite binary sequences
(define (test-bseq program . l)
(let ((len (if (null? l) 4 (car l))))
(map (lambda (seq)
(display "Testing on: ") (display (first seq len))
(let ((p (program seq))) (cmdisplay "Result:"
(car p) "." (cdr p))))
(generate-seq len)))
*the-non-printing-object*)
; test the Scheme program on one infinite sequence of random colors
(define (test-rseq p k n l)
(let* ((len (fxmax 4 l))
(lseq (rand-seq k len))
(fseq (seq-fn lseq))
(res (((p k) n) fseq )))
(display "Testing on: ") (display lseq)
(cmdisplay "Result:"
(car res) "." (cdr res))))
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; definitions needed for term-to-scheme-expr
(define (|ListAppend| l1)
(lambda (l2)
(append l1 l2)))
(define (|listrec| l)
(lambda (base)
(lambda (step)
(if (null? l)
base
(((step (car l)) (cdr l))
(((|listrec| (cdr l)) base) step))))))
(define (|NatMax| n1)
(lambda (n2)
(max n1 n2)))
(define |ListLength| length)
(define (|ListProj| n)
(lambda (l) (if (< n (length l)) (list-ref l n) 0)))
; prepare a Scheme program for modal Dialectica translation
(define (prepare-a term k n)
(let ((prog (eval (term-to-scheme-expr term)))) ((prog k) n)))
; animate subprograms for modular modal Dialectica
(define |mdGoal| (eval (term-to-scheme-expr extr_term-g)))
(define |mdIPH| (eval (term-to-scheme-expr nterm-iph)))
; Trifon’s complete test, here for modular modal Dialectica translation
(test-bseq (prepare-a extr_term-km 2 1)) ; for 2-coloring require two indices l_0 , l_1
; output is correct and immediate - see the next Appendix section
; Scheme program for Unbounded Pigeonhole
(define prog (eval (term-to-scheme-expr extr_term-km)))
; Dan’s test on a randomly generated sequence (each call is for yet another sequence)
(time (test-rseq prog 3 3 81)) ; only 81 = 3^4 first colors on tape need to be random
;; 33 minutes [worst case!] runtime for 3 colors and 4 indexes; output always in [0,80]
;; > Testing on:
;; (0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 1
;; 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 2 2 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 1 2 2 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 1)
;; ; (Result: 41 . (44 43 42 41))
;; - the color is 0, the last 4 of the 5 zeros in the middle of the 81-length sequence
;; (time (test-rseq prog 3 3 81))
;; 114842 collections
;; 1940934 ms elapsed cpu time, including 21405 ms collecting
;; 1940874 ms elapsed real time, including 20796 ms collecting
;; 483706748128 bytes allocated, including 483704052400 bytes reclaimed
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Appendix Bis
Petite Chez Scheme Version 8.4 Copyright (c) 1985-2011 Cadence Research Systems
> Minlog loaded successfully > ; etsmd successfully loaded > > > loading nat.scm
> loading list.scm > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ok, program constant mdIPH: nat=>(nat=>nat)=>
((nat=>(nat=>nat)=>nat)=>nat)@@((nat=>(nat=>nat)=>nat)=>nat@@(nat=>nat)) of
t-degree 0 and arity 2 added; functional realizing Infinite Pigeonhole principle
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > ok, program constant mdGoal: (nat=>nat)=>nat=>((nat=>nat)=>nat=>list nat)@@
((nat=>nat)=>nat=>nat) of t-degree 0 and arity 2 added > > ; (define extr_term-km
(proof-to-extracted-md-term (theorem-name-to-proof "FinalGoal"))) ; term extraction
; all k,f(all b exca n all m(n<=m -> f m=b -> F) -> all n f n<k -> F) by theorem IPH
; all f,b(all n exca m(n<=m ! f m=b) -> all n(all l(Lh l=Succ n -> all m(m<n ->
(Succ m thof l)<(m thof l)) --> all m(m<Succ n -> f(m thof l)=b) --> F) -> F)) by
theorem Goal ; Type of final extracted term is (nat=>nat=>(nat=>nat)=>nat@@list nat)
; first argument is the number of colors, second argument is number of indexes - 1
; third argument is the infinite sequence of colors; output is pair <nat, list nat>
; first output is smallest index of the monochromatic subsequence, counting from 0
; second output is the list of indexes that give the monochromatic subsequence
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ; (test-bseq (prepare-a extr_term-km 2 1))
Testing on: (1 1 1 1) ;; (Result: 1 . (3 1))
Testing on: (0 1 1 1) ;; (Result: 1 . (3 1))
Testing on: (1 0 1 1) ;; (Result: 0 . (2 0))
Testing on: (0 0 1 1) ;; (Result: 0 . (1 0))
Testing on: (1 1 0 1) ;; (Result: 1 . (3 1))
Testing on: (0 1 0 1) ;; (Result: 1 . (3 1))
Testing on: (1 0 0 1) ;; (Result: 1 . (2 1))
Testing on: (0 0 0 1) ;; (Result: 1 . (2 1))
Testing on: (1 1 1 0) ;; (Result: 1 . (2 1))
Testing on: (0 1 1 0) ;; (Result: 1 . (2 1))
Testing on: (1 0 1 0) ;; (Result: 0 . (2 0))
Testing on: (0 0 1 0) ;; (Result: 0 . (1 0))
Testing on: (1 1 0 0) ;; (Result: 2 . (3 2))
Testing on: (0 1 0 0) ;; (Result: 2 . (3 2))
Testing on: (1 0 0 0) ;; (Result: 1 . (2 1))
Testing on: (0 0 0 0) ;; (Result: 1 . (2 1))
; (define prog (eval (term-to-expr extr_term-km))) ; corresponding Scheme program
; (time (test-rseq prog 2 9 1024)) > > Testing on a random kilobit sequence
1 0 0 1 1 1 *1* 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 *1* 0 0 1 0 0 0 *1* 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
*1* 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 *1* 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 *1* 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 *1* 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 *1* 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 *1* 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 *1* 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
--- another twentyseven lines of thirtytwo-bit words broken in four bytes ---
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
; (Result: 6 . (88 78 70 60 51 42 32 23 16 6)) ; nine indexes, counting from zero
(time (test-rseq prog 2 9 1024)) ; hence index 6 points to the seventh element
20 collections
281 ms elapsed cpu time, including 31 ms collecting
289 ms elapsed real time, including 1 ms collecting
84957320 bytes allocated, including 84216472 bytes reclaimed
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Appendix Extra: ‘pretty printed’ normalized MinLog term for Unbounded Pigeonhole Principle
; (pp extr_term-km); 5 lines; raw functional term extracted from ‘FinalGoal’
> [k,n,f]
left(mdIPH k f)([b,f8508]right(mdGoal f b)f8508 n)@
left(mdGoal f left(right(mdIPH k f)([b,f8508]right(mdGoal f b)f8508 n)))
right(right(mdIPH k f)([b,f8508]right(mdGoal f b)f8508 n))
n
; (pp nterm-g); 13 lines; functional term ‘mdGoal’ extracted from ‘Goal’ proof
> [f0,n1]
([f2,n3]
(Rec nat=>list nat)n3(f2 0):
([n4,l5][if l5 (Nil nat) ([n6,l7]f2(Succ n6)::n6::l7)]))@
([f2,n3]
(Rec nat=>nat)n3 0
([n4,n5]
[let n6
[if ((Rec nat=>list nat)n4(f2 0):
([n6,l7][if l7 (Nil nat) ([n8,l9]f2(Succ n8)::n8::l9)]))
0
([n6,l7]Succ n6)]
[if (negb(n6<=f2 n6 impb negb(f0(f2 n6)=n1))) n5 n6]]))
; (pp nterm-iph); 115 lines; functional term ‘mdIPH’ extracted from ‘IPH’ proof
;; (av "y" (py "nat@@(nat=>nat)"))
;; (av "x" (py "(nat=>(nat=>nat)=>nat)"))
;; (av "BiG" (py "(nat=>nat)=>((nat=>(nat=>nat)=>nat)=>nat)@@(
(nat=>(nat=>nat)=>nat)=>nat@@(nat=>nat) )") )
> [n0]
(Rec nat=>(nat=>nat)=>((nat=>(nat=>nat)=>nat)=>nat)@@(
(nat=>(nat=>nat)=>nat)=>nat@@(nat=>nat) ) )
n0
([f3]([x4]0)@([x4]0@([n5]0)))
([n3,BiG4,f5]
([x6]
x6 n3
([n7]
n7 max
left(BiG4([n8]f5(n7 max n8)))([n8,f9]x6 n8([n10]n7 max f9 n10)))max
left(BiG4
([n7]
f5
(x6 n3
([n8]
n8 max
left(BiG4([n9]f5(n8 max n9)))
([n9,f10]x6 n9([n11]n8 max f10 n11)))max
n7)))
([n7,f8]
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x6 n7
([n9]
x6 n3
([n10]
n10 max
left(BiG4([n11]f5(n10 max n11)))
([n11,f12]x6 n11([n13]n10 max f12 n13)))max
f8 n9)))@
([x6]
[let y7
(n3@
([n7]
n7 max
left(BiG4([n8]f5(n7 max n8)))([n8,f9]x6 n8([n10]n7 max f9 n10))))
([if (x6 left y7 right y7<=right y7(x6 left y7 right y7)impb
negb(f5(right y7(x6 left y7 right y7))=left y7))
(left(right(BiG4
([n8]
f5
(x6 n3
([n9]
n9 max
left(BiG4([n10]f5(n9 max n10)))
([n10,f11]x6 n10([n12]n9 max f11 n12)))max
n8)))
([n8,f9]
x6 n8
([n10]
x6 n3
([n11]
n11 max
left(BiG4([n12]f5(n11 max n12)))
([n12,f13]x6 n12([n14]n11 max f13 n14)))max
f9 n10))))
(left y7)]@
([n8]
[if (x6 left y7 right y7<=right y7(x6 left y7 right y7)impb
negb(f5(right y7(x6 left y7 right y7))=left y7))
(x6 n3
([n9]
n9 max
left(BiG4([n10]f5(n9 max n10)))
([n10,f11]x6 n10([n12]n9 max f11 n12)))max
right(right(BiG4
([n9]
f5
(x6 n3
([n10]
n10 max
left(BiG4([n11]f5(n10 max n11)))
([n11,f12]x6 n11([n13]n10 max f12 n13)))max
n9)))
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([n9,f10]
x6 n9
([n11]
x6 n3
([n12]
n12 max
left(BiG4([n13]f5(n12 max n13)))
([n13,f14]x6 n13([n15]n12 max f14 n15)))max
f10 n11)))
n8)
(right y7 n8)]))]))
>
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